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The Preemptive Power of Federal Patent Law:    
A Framework for Analyzing State Antitrust 
Challenges to Pay-for-Delay Settlements 
Caroline Marsili* 
Since the passage of the Hatch-Waxman Act (the Act) in 
1984,1 patent litigation in the pharmaceutical industry has 
generated a troubling breed of settlement agreements wherein 
the payment goes from patentee plaintiffs to allegedly 
infringing defendants, resulting in anticompetitive effects.2 The 
provisions of the Act, though intended to promote innovation 
and lower drug prices while expediting infringement litigation, 
tend to incentivize reverse payments, or pay-for-delay 
settlements.3 The settlements are often challenged by the 
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 1. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration (Hatch-
Waxman) Act, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984); Gregory Dolin, Reverse 
Settlements as Patent Invalidity Signals, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 281, 286 
(2011). 
 2. See, e.g., In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 204 (3d Cir. 2012) 
(“[I]n the years after the passage of Hatch-Waxman, some of the patent 
infringement suits occurring under the Hatch-Waxman framework were 
resolved through settlement agreements in which the patent holder paid the 
would-be generic manufacturer to drop its patent challenge and refrain from 
producing a generic drug for a specified period. These agreements are known 
as ‘reverse payment agreements’ or ‘exclusion agreements.’”); 12 PHILLIP E. 
AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF 
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 337 (3d ed. 2006); Michael A. 
Carrier, Unsettling Drug Patent Settlements: A Framework for Presumptive 
Illegality, 108 MICH. L. REV. 37, 37 (2009); Thomas F. Cotter, Refining the 
“Presumptive Illegality” Approach to Settlements of Patent Disputes Involving 
Reverse Payments: A Commentary on Hovenkamp, Janis & Lemley, 87 MINN. 
L. REV. 1789, 1797 (2003). 
 3. 12 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, at 340–41; Cotter, supra note 
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Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and by private parties for 
violation of antitrust law.4 Thus, pay-for-delay settlements 
illustrate a tension between patent law and antitrust law.5 
Since the adoption of the Act, courts have struggled to 
harmonize the two bodies of law with regard to pay-for-delay 
settlements, as evidenced by the widely divergent rulings on 
the legality of these settlements among regional circuit courts.6 
In December 2012, the Supreme Court granted a writ of 
certiorari to review Federal Trade Commission v. Watson 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,7 an Eleventh Circuit case favoring the 
pharmaceutical companies,8 and should enunciate the proper 
legal standard to apply to pay-for-delay settlements. 
 
                                                          
2, at 1797–802. 
 4. See Paula L. Blizzard et al., Antitrust, in AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW, ANDA LITIGATION: STRATEGIES AND TACTICS FOR 
PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT LITIGATORS 293, 304–24 (Kenneth L. Dorsney et al. 
eds., 2012). 
 5. For a detailed analysis of the tension between antitrust law and 
patent law in the context of pay-for-delay settlements, see, for example, Alden 
F. Abbott & Susan T. Michel, The Right Balance of Competition Policy and 
Intellectual Property Law: A Perspective on Settlements of Pharmaceutical 
Patent Litigation, in PRACTISING LAW INST., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
ANTITRUST 387, 393 (2006). For a summary of the tension between antitrust 
law and intellectual property law in general, see CHRISTOPHER R. LESLIE, 
ANTITRUST LAW AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 39–86 (2011). 
 6. In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 209–14; 1 HERBERT HOVENKAMP ET AL., IP 
AND ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW, at 15-30 to 15-49 (2d ed. Supp. 2012); Michael 
A. Carrier, Why the “Scope of the Patent” Test Cannot Solve the Drug Patent 
Settlement Problem, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 1–5 (2012). 
 7. FTC v. Watson Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 677 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2012), 
cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 787 (2012). The Eleventh Circuit held that the 
appropriate test for pay-for-delay settlements is “absent sham litigation or 
fraud in obtaining the patent, a reverse payment settlement is immune from 
antitrust attack so long as its anticompetitive effects fall within the scope of 
the exclusionary potential of the patent.” Id. at 1312. 
 8. Id. at 1315. The Supreme Court chose to hear Watson in lieu of 
another case with a certiorari petition, In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at  197, where 
the Third Circuit found pay-for-delay settlements “presumptively 
anticompetitive.” See Kevin E. Noonan, FTC Asks Supreme Court to Play 
Favorites in Reverse Payment Settlement Agreement Cases, PATENTDOCS.ORG 
(Oct. 16, 2012), http://www.patentdocs.org/2012/10/ftc-asks-supreme-court-to-
play-favorites-in-reverse-payment-settlement-agreement-cases.html; Kevin E. 
Noonan, Supreme Court to Review Reverse Payment Settlement Agreements, 
PATENTDOCS.ORG (Dec. 9, 2012), http://www.patentdocs.org/2012/12/supreme-
court-to-review-reverse-payment-settlement-agreements.html. 
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Whether a court finds a pay-for-delay settlement illegal 
often reflects the extent to which the court defers to federal 
patent law—the greater the deference to patent law, the more 
likely a finding of legality.9 Challenges to pay-for-delay 
settlements have thus far been adjudicated almost exclusively 
in federal court,10 but these challenges are brought under both 
federal and state antitrust laws, and one challenge is currently 
awaiting rehearing by the Supreme Court of California.11 
Should pay-for-delay settlements be challenged in state courts 
in the future, the doctrine of preemption may pose an obstacle 
for state antitrust claims confronting the legality of patent 
infringement settlements.12 
This Note explores the applicability of the doctrine of 
preemption to state antitrust claims challenging pay-for-delay 
settlements. Part I of this Note outlines the history and current 
status of pay-for-delay settlements, draws attention to 
potential areas of conflict between antitrust law and patent 
law, and reviews principles of preemption as enunciated by the 
Supreme Court. Part II explores the applicability of the 
doctrine of preemption to state antitrust challenges to pay-for-
delay-settlements and proposes a framework for determining 
whether state antitrust law is preempted by federal patent law. 
This Note concludes that state antitrust claims are likely not 
preempted by federal patent law in the context of pay-for-delay 
settlements, nor should they be in light of policy concerns. 
                                                          
 9. See Carrier, supra note 6, at 1–2 (“Courts have analyzed [pay-for-
delay settlements] by relying on a test that asks if the settlement falls within 
the ‘scope of the patent.’ They have found, in nearly all of these cases, that it 
does. And, as a result, they have concluded that the agreements do not violate 
the antitrust laws.”). Cf. 1 HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 6, at 15-36 (“The 
Eleventh Circuit reasoned from the premise that a valid patent gives its owner 
a right to exclude to the conclusion that the payment for exclusion was not an 
unwarranted extension of the patent.”). 
 10. One exception, and the inspiration for this Note, is discussed in note 
12, infra. 
 11. In re Cipro Cases I & II, 200 Cal. App. 4th 442 (2011), rev. granted, 
269 P.3d 653 (Cal. 2012); Bernice Yeung, State Court to Examine “Pay-for-
Delay” Deals by Drugmakers, CAL. WATCH (Mar. 2, 2012), http://california 
watch.org/dailyreport/state-court-examine-pay-delay-deals-drugmakers-15133. 
 12. The Supreme Court made many preemption decisions in the first 
decade of the twenty-first century, and though these decisions have not been 
entirely consistent or clear, they have demonstrated that the Court considers 
preemption a valuable instrument in assessing the balance of state and 
federal power in various fields. See Ernest A. Young, “The Ordinary Diet of the 
Law”: The Presumption Against Preemption in the Robert’s Court, 2011 SUP. 
CT. REV. 253, 253–57 (2012). 
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I. A PARALLEL HISTORY OF PAY-FOR-DELAY 
SETTLEMENTS AND PREEMPTION OF                  
FEDERAL PATENT LAW 
A. ANDA LITIGATION AND PAY-FOR-DELAY SETTLEMENTS 
The Act creates a series of incentives that make settlement 
an attractive option to both pioneering and generic 
pharmaceutical companies involved in Abbreviated New Drug 
Applications (ANDA) litigation.13 The settlement agreements 
have been challenged for violating antitrust laws, with 
disparate results among federal circuit courts.14 The status of 
these settlements is contested and uncertain.15 
1. The Hatch-Waxman Act 
Before the Act was passed, there was a significant gap 
between the time that a patent expired on a pioneer’s drug and 
the time that a generic manufacturer was able to market its 
version of the drug.16 In response to the need to promote 
pioneering in the pharmaceutical industry and to introduce 
low-cost generic versions of new drugs at the expiration of the 
pioneer’s patent, Congress passed the Act in 1984.17 The Act 
made changes to patent law and to the United States Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA) approval process for new drug 
products in an effort to both protect the exclusive patent rights 
of pioneering drug companies and encourage the entry of lower-
                                                          
 13. See supra text accompanying note 3. “Pioneer” will be used to refer to 
a drug company that is the first to patent and market a drug. 
 14. See ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT 
LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 1330 (5th ed. 2011). 
 15. See 1 HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 6, at 15-48 to 15-49. 
 16. See MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 14, at 1329. 
 17. See, e.g., Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration 
(Hatch-Waxman) Act, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (“To amend the 
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to revise the procedures for new drug 
applications, to amend title 35, United States Code, to authorize the extension 
of the patents for certain regulated products, and for other purposes.”); 12 
AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, at 338 (“The 1984 Hatch-Waxman 
legislation attempted to balance the pioneer drug manufacturers’ innovation 
incentives against the need to facilitate market entry by manufacturers of 
equivalent generic products.”); James M. Lennon et al., Statutory and 
Regulatory Scheme, in AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW, 
supra note 4, at 1. The Act was also a response to the 1962 amendments to the 
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA); these amendments created the 
requirement that new products be proven safe and effective by the FDA, which 
discouraged market-entry of generic companies. Lenon et al., supra, at 2. 
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cost generic drugs into the market.18 First, the Act created the 
ANDA.19 The ANDA process is a means for expediting FDA 
approval of a generic drug that is the bioequivalent20 of a 
patented brand-name drug.21 When a generic company files an 
ANDA, it must certify 
[e]ither that no patent was filed for the listed drug (a “paragraph I” 
certification), that the patent has expired (a “paragraph II” 
certification), that the patent will expire on a specified date and the 
ANDA filer will not market the drug until that date (a “paragraph 
III” certification), or that the patent is invalid or would not be 
infringed by the manufacture, use, or sale of the new drug (a 
“paragraph IV” certification).22 
The Act also amended the Patent Act of 1980 to extend the 
patent term for new pharmaceuticals.23 The extension of the 
                                                          
 18. See 1 HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 6, at 15-24 to 15-25. 
 19. 98 Stat. at 1585; Kenneth L. Dorsney, Preface to AM. BAR ASS’N 
SECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW, supra note 4, at xxi. 
 20. The ANDA applicant must present evidence in its application that its 
generic drug has the same active ingredient as the patent-holder’s drug. 
Lennon et al., supra note 17, at 18–19. (“[B]ioequivalence is established by 
showing that the generic drug does not significantly differ in the rate and 
extent to which the active ingredient becomes available in the body or at the 
site of action as compared to the NDA drug.”). “Bioequivalence” is statulorily 
defined as follows: 
(B) A drug shall be considered to be bioequivalent to a listed drug if—
(i) the rate and extent of absorption of the drug do not show a 
significant difference from the rate and extent of absorption of the 
listed drug when administered at the same molar dose of the 
therapeutic ingredient under similar experimental conditions in 
either a single dose or multiple doses; or (ii) the extent of absorption 
of the drug does not show a significant difference from the extent of 
absorption of the listed drug when administered at the same molar 
dose of the therapeutic ingredient under similar experimental 
conditions in either a single dose or multiple doses and the difference 
from the listed drug in the rate of absorption of the drug is 
intentional, is reflected in its proposed labeling, is not essential to the 
attainment of effective body drug concentrations on chronic use, and 
is considered medically insignificant for the drug. 
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(8)(B) (2006). 
 21. Dorsney, supra note 19, at xxi. 
 22. In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 191 (2d Cir. 
2006) (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii) (2006)). See, e.g., Roger D. Blair & 
Thomas F. Cotter, Are Settlements of Patent Disputes Illegal Per Se?, 47 
ANTITRUST BULL. 491, 505–06 (2002); Lennon et al., supra note 17, at 12. The 
“paragraph IV certification constitutes a technical act of patent infringement,” 
In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 204 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing 35 U.S.C. 
§ 271(e)(2)(A) (2006)), in which the ANDA applicant asserts that the existing 
patent is either invalid or not infringed. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV) (2006). 
 23. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration (Hatch-
Waxman) Act, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585, 1598 (1984); see also Lennon 
et al., supra note 17, at 5 (“The Hatch-Waxman Act specifies that the term of a 
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patent term benefits patentee companies that seek to file a 
New Drug Application (NDA);24 these filers have drugs which 
may be delayed from entering the market due to the FDA 
review process.25 The extension benefits NDA filers because it 
allows NDA filers to recover up to five years on the life of their 
patent for administrative delays.26 The patent term extension 
applies to patents claiming “products, methods of 
manufacturing, and methods of use for human and veterinary 
drugs, medical devices, and food additives.”27 
Perhaps most importantly, the Act created a framework for 
resolving patent disputes in the pharmaceutical industry.28 
This framework consists of several critical innovations. First, 
the Act created a “listing” requirement for the pioneering drug 
companies.29 This provision requires NDA filers to list “any 
patent which claims the drug for which the applicant submitted 
the application or which claimed the method of using such a 
                                                          
patent covering [New Drug Application] inventions can be extended to make 
up for patent life lost during the approval process for the patented drug.”). The 
patent term was extended for products or methods of use of manufacture of 
products if 
(1) the term of the patent has not expired before an application is 
submitted under subsection (d) for its extension; (2) the term of the 
patent has never been extended; (3) an application for extension is 
submitted by the owner of record of the patent or its agent and in 
accordance with the requirements of subsection (d); (4) the product 
has been subject to a regulatory review period before its commercial 
marketing or use; (5)(A) except as provided in subparagraph (B), the 
permission for the commercial marketing or use of the product after 
such regulatory review period is the first permitted commercial 
marketing or use of the product under the provision of law under 
which such regulatory review period occurred . . . . The product 
referred to in paragraphs (4) and (5) is hereinafter in this section 
referred to as the ‘approved product’. (b) The rights derived from any 
patent the term of which is extended under this section shall during 
the period during which the patent is extended—(1) in the case of a 
patent which claims a product, be limited to any use approved for the 
approved product before the expiration of the term of the patent 
under the provision of law under which the applicable regulatory 
review occurred . . . . 
98 Stat. at 1598. 
 24. Lennon et al., supra note 17, at 5. 
 25. See Blair & Cotter, supra note 22, at 502–04. 
 26. Lennon et al., supra note 17, at 5. 
 27. Id.; see supra note 23. 
 28. 12 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, at 338; 1 HOVENKAMP ET AL., 
supra note 6, at 15-25; Lennon et al., supra note 17, at 4. 
 29. 12 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, at 338; 1 HOVENKAMP ET AL., 
supra note 6, at 15-25. 
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drug and with respect to which a claim of patent infringement 
could reasonably be asserted . . . .”30 Second, the Act provided 
for a thirty-month stay of FDA approval of the generic drug, 
upon filing of an infringement suit by the pioneer.31 When a 
generic drug company files an ANDA, the pioneer has forty-five 
days to sue for infringement, or else the ANDA approval 
becomes effective immediately thereafter.32 However, if the 
pioneer drug company brings suit, ANDA approval will not be 
effective until the end of a thirty-month stay period (with some 
exceptions).33 Finally, the Act gives the first generic to file an 
ANDA a 180-day exclusivity period in the market upon 
expiration (or finding of invalidity) of the pioneer’s patent.34 
This provision gives the first generic manufacturer to file an 
ANDA the exclusive right to commercialize the product for 180 
days upon the expiration of the pioneer’s patent, or, if the 
pioneer’s patent is found invalid, 180 days from the court 
decision, whichever comes first.35 
2. The Origins of ANDA Litigation 
The pay-for-delay settlements encouraged by the Act follow 
a basic pattern in which the plaintiff in a patent infringement 
suit (the pioneering drug company) pays a settlement to the 
defendant (the generic company) upon agreement that 
defendant will delay commercialization of its product.36 These 
pay-for-delay settlements may appeal to both parties under the 
                                                          
 30. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (2006); see also 12 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra 
note 2, at 339 n.66 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (2006)). 
 31. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii); 12 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, 
at 338–39; 1 HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 6, at 15-25. 
 32. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii); 1 HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 6, at 15-
27 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (2006)). 
 33. 1 HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 6, at 15-27 (“If a court concludes in a 
final decision that the patent is invalid or not infringed prior to the expiration 
of the 30-month stay, ANDA approval is effective as of the date of that court 
decision.” (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii)(I) (2006))). 
 34. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration (Hatch-
Waxman) Act, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585, 1589 (1984); see 12 AREEDA & 
HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, at 339; 1 HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 6, at 15-
25; Lennon et al., supra note 17, at 22. 
 35. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv); 1 HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 6, at 15-
28 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (2006)). 
 36. See, e.g., 12 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, at 338; 1 
HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 6, at 15-24; Alden F. Abbott & Susan T. 
Michel, The Right Balance of Competition Policy and Intellectual Property 
Law: A Perspective on Settlements of Pharmaceutical Patent Litigation, in 
PRACTISING LAW INST., supra note 5, at  387, 393 (2006). 
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Act’s framework.37 The generic company may accept a 
settlement payment and in return agree to delay entry into the 
market for some time.38 This delays the generic company’s 180-
day exclusivity period and thereby keeps other generic 
companies from entering the market.39 
To illustrate the incentives for settlement, consider In re 
Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation,40 in which a pioneer drug 
company had a patent on a drug, a generic drug company filed 
an ANDA with a paragraph IV certification for their version of 
that drug, and the pioneer drug company filed suit.41 During 
litigation over infringement of the pioneer company’s drug 
patent, the parties entered an agreement in which the pioneer 
company paid the generic company $10 million per quarter to 
delay entry into the market.42 Litigation was prolonged, the 
180-day exclusivity period for the generic company was 
postponed, and other generic companies were barred from 
entering the market for this time.43 
Under this agreement, both parties were better off than 
they would have been if they had litigated the case to 
completion. Both would have spent time and money on 
litigating the case, the pioneer drug company was able to 
extend its monopoly, and the generic got paid, perhaps more 
than it would have profited from actually manufacturing the 
drug.44 
Because of incentives for collusive settlements, the FTC 
requires disclosure of pay-for-delay settlements, to screen for 
                                                          
 37. For an explanation of how the provisions of the Act incentivize sham 
litigation, see Blair & Cotter, supra note 22, at 506–10. 
 38. See, e.g., Carrier, supra note 2, at 39. 
 39. HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 6, at 15-29. 
 40. In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2003). 
 41. Id. at 901–02. 
 42. Id. at 903. 
 43. Id. at 904. 
 44. Cf. Carrier, supra note 2, at 39–40. See also Abbott & Michel, supra 
note 5, at 414–15. Under the Hatch-Waxman framework, 
generic drugs sell for less than their branded counterparts, [so] 
generic entry causes the branded company to lose more in profits than 
the generic company earns, with the difference accruing as consumer 
savings . . . . A brand company could pay a generic to delay market 
entry more than it would earn by entering, and still be better off than 
if it faced competition . . . . [T]he brand firm and its generic rival are 
always better off eliminating their expected competition and sharing 
the brand’s monopoly profits. 
Id. at 414. 
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anticompetitive effects.45 FTC studies on these settlements 
reveal that settlement payments often pass from pioneer to 
generic manufacturer, and range in the tens of millions of 
dollars.46 The FTC has recognized the severity of this problem, 
noting that “[i]n Fiscal Year (FY) 2012, the number of 
potentially anticompetitive patent dispute settlements between 
branded and generic drug companies increased significantly 
compared with FY 2011, jumping from 28 to 40 . . . .”47 The 
FTC suggests that these settlements cost American consumers 
$3.5 billion annually.48 
3. The IP/Antitrust Interface 
Patent law and antitrust law can clash with regards to 
their underlying policy considerations.49 Patent law protects 
individual property rights of inventors in order to promote 
innovation and competition, while antitrust seeks to prevent 
monopoly power and anticompetitive behavior.50 Pay-for-delay 
settlements illustrate this tension, as they may produce 
anticompetitive effects that harm consumers.51 However, in 
those cases where patent settlements may produce 
anticompetitive effects, the settlements are susceptible to 
antitrust analysis.52 
In considering the purposes of the antitrust laws, it seems 
Congress intended to protect competition and prevent 
monopoly.53 However, as Areeda and Hovenkamp describe in 
                                                          
 45. 1 HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 6, at 15-30. 
 46. Id. 
 47. FTC Study: In FY 2012, Branded Drug Firms Significantly Increased 
the Use of Potential Pay-for-Delay Settlements to Keep Generic Competitors off 
the Market, FED. TRADE COMMISSION (Jan. 17, 2013), http://www.ftc.gov/ 
opa/2013/01/mmarpt.shtm. 
 48. Id. 
 49. See generally Mark A. Lemley, A New Balance Between IP and 
Antitrust, 13 SW. J.L. & TRADE AMERICAS 237, 238–45, 253–56 (2007) 
(discussing the nature and purposes of IP and antitrust law and arguing for 
an equal balance between the two bodies of law). 
 50. See Abbott & Michel, supra note 5, at 391–92. But see Lemley, supra 
note 49, at 1–9. Lemley acknowledges the tension exists in some situations, 
but finds the goals of the two systems are not really in conflict. Id. at 9–17. 
 51. See supra notes 47–48 and accompanying text. It should be noted that 
settlements of patent disputes in general have the potential to produce 
procompetitive effects, through both benefit to consumers and judicial 
efficiency. See Abbott & Michel, supra note 5, at 392–93. 
 52. See MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 14, at 1330; infra Part I.A.4. 
 53. See, e.g., 1 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST 
LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 3 (3d 
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their treatise, “the principle objective of antitrust policy is to 
maximize consumer welfare by encouraging firms to behave 
competitively while yet permitting them to take advantage of 
every available economy that comes from internal or jointly 
created production efficiencies, or from innovation producing 
new processes or new or improved products.”54 However, the 
authors note that the antitrust laws are specifically designed to 
protect competition, and not to address the detrimental 
outcomes that may result.55 The Sherman Act was the first 
federal statement of the antitrust laws, which was meant to 
codify the pre-existing state competition laws, and the drafters 
of the Sherman Act were concerned with injury to competitors 
caused by monopoly pricing.56 
States have their own antitrust laws that largely overlap 
with the regulations of the Sherman Act, though states may 
impose stricter or more lenient regulations than federal 
antitrust laws.57 These state laws may be preempted in 
situations where they allow something that federal law 
prohibits, or they prohibit something that federal law 
permits,58 the latter being the more usual case.59 
Antitrust challenges to the legality of pay-for-delay 
settlements generally arise under section 1 of the Sherman Act, 
which states that “[e]very contract, combination in the form of 
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or 
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is 
declared to be illegal.”60 However, “the Supreme Court has long 
                                                          
ed. 2006) (quoting Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 249 (1951)). 
 54. Id. at 4. 
 55. The laws do not purport to remedy the negative results of competition, 
including increased income inequality, losses due to failed risks, and displaced 
human capital and infrastructure. See id. at 6. 
 56. See id. at 9–10. Though it should be noted that the framers of the Act 
did not necessarily distinguish between these two injured parties. See id. at 
52–53. For a thorough discussion of the legislative history of the Sherman Act, 
see id. at 42–63. Areeda and Hovenkamp ultimately conclude that the 
legislative history should be given little weight in crafting policy implications 
of the Sherman Act. Id. at 59. 
 57. See 1 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 53, at 339; cf. California v. 
ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 102 (1989) (“Congress intended the federal 
antitrust laws to supplement, not displace, state antitrust remedies.”). 
 58. See 1 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 53, at 339. 
 59. Id. at 347. 
 60. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006); see also In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 
197, 208 (3d Cir. 2012) (listing section 1 of the Sherman Act as the “general 
antitrust standard”). 
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construed [section 1] to prohibit only unreasonable 
restraints.”61 Courts may take one of several different 
approaches in determining whether an unreasonable restraint 
on trade exists, namely the per se rule, the rule of reason 
analysis, and the quick look approach.62 Usually, a court will 
apply the rule of reason approach, in which the fact finder 
determines whether a practice restrains competition in light of 
relevant market factors.63 Courts treat some conduct as per se 
illegal if the conduct is very likely to result in anticompetitive 
effects.64 Courts may apply the intermediate “quick look” 
approach in cases where the conduct is similar to that which 
requires the per se treatment.65 
In the case of pay-for-delay settlements, the contested 
conduct may be actions of the pioneer drug company plaintiff, 
or the pioneer and generic drug company defendant together, 
that results in the delayed entry of the generic competitor into 
the market.66 However, patent law allows the pioneer patentee 
to exclude others from making, using, and selling the patented 
drug.67 Therefore, under patent law, the plaintiff should be able  
 
                                                          
 61. In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 209. 
 62. See LESLIE, supra note 5, at 26–27. 
 63. See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997). The fact-finder 
decides “whether the questioned practice imposes an unreasonable restraint 
on competition, taking into account a variety of factors, including specific 
information about the relevant business, its condition before and after the 
restraint was imposed, and the restraint’s history, nature, and effect.” Id. 
Further, under this approach, the plaintiff has the initial burden of proving 
that the activity has anticompetitive market effects, the defendant then must 
show that the activity promotes a pro-competitive goal, and lastly, the plaintiff 
then has a chance to show that the activity is not necessary to promote the 
pro-competitive goal. See In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 209. 
 64. See, e.g., In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 209; LESLIE, supra note 5, at 26 
(“The per se rule is categorical; if an agreement falls in a per se category, then 
the agreement violates Section One, without any analysis of the agreement’s 
actual effect on competitive conditions.”). California’s Cartwright Act follows 
the Sherman Act in this respect, categorizing certain agreements as illegal per 
se if they “have a pernicious effect on competition and lack any redeeming 
virtue.” In re Cipro Cases I & II, 200 Cal. App. 4th 442, 467 (2011), rev. 
granted, 269 P.3d 653 (Cal. 2012). 
 65. See, e.g., In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 209. In the context of pay-for-delay 
settlements, the plaintiff shifts the burden to the defendant by showing that 
the payment went to the generic company and caused delay of the generic 
product’s entry to the market, after which the defendant must prove the 
settlement was pro-competitive or competitively neutral. See Blair & Cotter, 
supra note 22, at 534. 
 66. See, e.g., Blizzard et al., supra note 4, at 293. 
 67. E.g., 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2006). 
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to enter into agreements that do not extend its exclusionary 
power beyond the protection of the patent.68 
Though these antitrust claims contesting the legality of 
pay-for-delay settlements are brought under the Sherman Act, 
federal law only allows monetary damages for direct 
purchasers of the patented drug.69 This means that end 
consumers and other indirect purchasers may not recover 
damages in antitrust challenges brought under the Sherman 
Act, though they do have the option of injunctive relief.70 
However, many state antitrust statutes reward damages to 
indirect purchasers.71 Therefore, in many pay-for-delay  
 
 
                                                          
 68. See, e.g., Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1076 (11th 
Cir. 2005); Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1304 (11th 
Cir. 2003). 
 69. See  15 U.S.C. § 15 (2006); Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 
734–35 (1977); Blizzard et al., supra note 4, at 303. In order for a private 
plaintiff (any plaintiff other than the U.S. government) to be eligible for 
damage awards, they must meet stringent standing requirements including 
showing that the conduct in question caused an injury-in-fact to the plaintiff’s 
business or property, that the recovery is not duplicative of that of a more 
directly injured person, that the injury is one that the antitrust laws were 
intended to prevent, and that the damages claimed are a reasonable measure 
of the injury. See, e.g., 2A PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, 
ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR 
APPLICATION 61–62 (3d ed. 2007). 
 70. See 15 U.S.C. § 26 (2006) (“Any person, firm, corporation, or 
association shall be entitled to sue for and have injunctive relief, in any court 
of the United States having jurisdiction over the parties, against threatened 
loss or damage by a violation of the antitrust laws . . . .”); see also ABA 
SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, STATE ANTITRUST PRACTICE AND STATUTES at 6-
51 (4th ed. 2009) (explaining that California’s Cartwright Act was amended in 
1978 to allow indirect purchasers to bring claims under the Act). 
 71. See Blizzard et al., supra note 4, at 304. For example, California’s 
Cartwright Act includes a damages provision which states that an action may 
be brought under the Act “by any person who is injured in his or her business 
or property by reason of anything forbidden or declared unlawful by this 
chapter, regardless of whether such injured person dealt directly or indirectly 
with the defendant.” CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16750 (West 2012). “Indirect 
purchasers” are purchasers who did not buy the product or service directly 
from one of the defendants in an antitrust action, but bought from a prior 
purchaser of the product or service.  Cf. California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 
93, 97 (1989) (“The State and the local governments were all indirect 
purchasers of concrete block—that is, they did not purchase concrete block 
directly from the price-fixing defendants but rather purchased products or 
contracted for construction into which the concrete block was incorporated by 
a prior purchaser.”). 
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challenges, courts apply state law to the contested settlement 
in concert with federal antitrust law.72 
4. The Legality of Pay-for-Delay Settlements 
The Federal Circuit Courts have taken different 
approaches to the legality of pay-for-delay settlements. In the 
In re Cardizem example outlined in Part I.A.2, the Sixth 
Circuit found that the settlement agreement was “a classic 
example of a per se illegal restraint on trade.”73 The court’s 
conclusion derived from the anticompetitive nature of the 
agreement to eliminate competition.74 
Some courts have been more deferential to the 
pharmaceutical companies, applying a rule of reason analysis.75 
In Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc.76 the 
Eleventh Circuit refused to find the reverse payment 
settlement per se illegal, concluding that “[u]nlike some kinds 
of agreements that are per se illegal whether engaged in by 
patentees or anyone else, such as tying or price-fixing, the 
exclusion of infringing competition is the essence of the patent 
grant.”77 The court further found that the fact that the patent 
at issue was later determined to be invalid did not subject the 
settlement agreement to per se treatment; the agreement 




                                                          
 72. See Blizzard et al., supra note 4, at 323 (“State laws often contain 
equivalent, or even broader claims than federal law, allowing indirect 
purchasers to pursue the state law equivalents of Walker Process claims, 
sham patent litigation claims, and sham citizen petitions claims.”). The 
Supreme Court has ruled that state antitrust laws that allow indirect 
purchasers to sue for damages are not preempted by federal antitrust law. See 
ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. at 101. 
 73. In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 907–08 (6th Cir. 
2003). 
 74. Id. at 908; see also Carrier, supra note 6, at 2 (“The court found that 
the brand paid ‘the only potential competitor $40 million per year to stay out 
of the market.’” (quoting In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 908 
(6th Cir. 2003))). 
 75. See generally supra notes 67–68 and accompanying text (describing 
how patentees should be able to make agreements that do not exceed the scope 
of their patent). 
 76. Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir. 
2003). 
 77. Id. at 1306. 
 78. Id. 
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The Eleventh Circuit later announced what became known 
as the “scope of the patent” test79 in Schering Plough Corp. v. 
FTC,80 evaluating “(1) the scope of the exclusionary potential of 
the patent; (2) the extent to which the agreements exceed that 
scope; and (3) the resulting anticompetitive effects.”81 Using 
this test, the court applied a presumption of patent validity,82 
and accordingly found no expansion beyond the scope of the 
patent in the settlement agreement.83 In reference to Valley 
Drug and Schering Plough, the Eleventh Circuit later “clarified 
that its prior opinions did not call for an evaluation of the 
strength of the patent but rather only a determination whether, 
absent sham litigation or fraud in obtaining the patent, the 
settlement agreement exceeded the scope of the patent.”84 In 
Andrx Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Elan Corp.,85 the Eleventh 
Circuit applied its three-part test, finding that plaintiff Andrx 
had sufficiently alleged a violation of section 1 of the Sherman 
Act;86 if Andrx’s allegation that the defendant generic drug 
company agreed never to market its product were true, then the 
agreement would exceed the exclusionary scope of the patent.87 
Taking the “scope of the patent” test one step further, the 
Second Circuit has characterized the settlements as essentially 
per se legal.88 In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litigation89 did 
not examine the validity of the patent, but drew the 
presumption that as long as the patent litigation is not a sham 
and the patentee has not exceeded the scope of the patent, the 
settlement is legal.90 The Court of Appeals for the Federal 
                                                          
 79. See Carrier, supra note 6, at 1. 
 80. Schering Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056 (11th Cir. 2005). 
 81. Id. at 1066. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 1075–76. 
 84. In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 212 (3d Cir. 2012). 
 85. Andrx Pharm., Inc., v. Elan Corp., 421 F.3d 1227 (11th Cir. 2005). 
 86. Id. at 1235. 
 87. Id. 
 88. See Carrier, supra note 6, at 3 (“Courts then imperceptibly shifted 
from punishing conduct ‘outside the scope’ of the patent to immunizing 
conduct ‘within the scope’ of the patent. In doing so, the test took a dramatic 
turn toward deference.”). 
 89. In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 90. See id. at 211–13. The Second Circuit made the following observation 
regarding the possibility that a patent on a brand name drug, which was the 
object of a contested settlement, was in fact invalid: 
We are not unaware of a troubling dynamic that is at work in these 
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Circuit (CAFC) affirmed the district court’s application of the 
“scope of the patent” test in In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride 
Antitrust Litigation,91 concluding that “[t]he essence of the 
inquiry is whether the agreements restrict competition beyond 
the exclusionary zone of the patent. This analysis has been 
adopted by the Second and the Eleventh Circuits and by the 
district court below and we find it to be completely consistent 
with Supreme Court precedent.”92 
The Third Circuit further complicated the circuit split in 
July 2012 when it applied a “quick look rule of reason analysis” 
in deciding In re K-Dur.93 The court enunciated the test as 
follows: 
[W]e will direct the District Court to apply a quick look rule of reason 
analysis based on the economic realities of the reverse payment 
settlement rather than the labels applied by the settling parties. 
Specifically, the finder of fact must treat any payment from a patent 
holder to a generic patent challenger who agrees to delay entry into 
the market as prima facie evidence of an unreasonable restraint of 
trade, which could be rebutted by showing that the payment (1) was 
for a purpose other than delayed entry or (2) offers some pro-
competitive benefit.94 
The court reasoned that: 
[T]he judicial preference for settlement, while generally laudable, 
should not displace countervailing public policy objectives or, in this 
case, Congress’s determination—which is evident from the structure 
of the Hatch-Waxman Act and the statements in the legislative 
record—that litigated patent challenges are necessary to protect 
consumers from unjustified monopolies by name brand drug 
manufacturers.95 
                                                          
cases. The less sound the patent or the less clear the infringement, 
and therefore the less justified the monopoly enjoyed by the patent 
holder, the more a rule permitting settlement is likely to benefit the 
patent holder by allowing it to retain the patent. But the law allows 
the settlement even of suits involving weak patents with the 
presumption that the patent is valid and that settlement is merely an 
extension of the valid patent monopoly. So long as the law encourages 
settlement, weak patent cases will likely be settled even though such 
settlements will inevitably protect patent monopolies that are, 
perhaps, undeserved. 
Id. at 211. 
 91. In re Ciproflaxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323 (Fed. 
Cir. 2008); see id. at 1333. CAFC was created primarily to interpret patent law 
and stand as a specialized court for national unity of patent regulation. See 
MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 14, at 10. 
 92. In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride, 544 F.3d at 1336. 
 93. In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 196, 218 (3d Cir. 2012). 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 217. 
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Finally, in FTC v. Watson Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,96 the 
Eleventh Circuit stuck to its precedent, stating, “Our Valley 
Drug, Schering-Plough, and Andrx decisions establish the rule 
that, absent sham litigation or fraud in obtaining the patent, a 
reverse payment settlement is immune from antitrust attack so 
long as its anticompetitive effects fall within the scope of the 
exclusionary potential of the patent.”97 This series of cases 
illustrates the uncertainty and inconsistency of pay-for-delay 
challenge jurisprudence, though the courts have generally 
embraced a more deferential approach in recent years. 
B. FEDERAL PATENT LAW PREEMPTION 
1. Federal Preemption 
The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, 
which declares that the “Laws of the United States” are “the 
Supreme Law of the Land,” provides the basis for the doctrine 
of preemption.98 Preemption stands for the idea that, “under 
                                                          
 96. FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir.), cert. granted, 
133 S. Ct. 787 (2012). 
 97. Id. at 1312 (citation omitted). The Eleventh Circuit gave a pointed 
rejection of the FTC’s argument to “adopt ‘a rule that an exclusion payment is 
unlawful if, viewing the situation objectively as of the time of the settlement, 
it is more likely than not that the patent would not have blocked generic entry 
earlier than the agreed-upon entry date.’” Id. By analyzing the defendants’ 
probability-based anticipation of success, 
[p]atent litigation can also be a high stakes, spin-the-chambers, all or 
nothing undertaking. For the company with a patented drug, it 
obviously makes sense to settle the infringement action if it is “not 
likely to prevail,” even though that company may have a substantial 
(up to 49%) chance of winning. On the other side of the settlement 
equation is the generic drug company that is only “likely to prevail” in 
the action; with a substantial (up to 49%) chance of losing, that 
company also has a legitimate motive for settling. When both sides of 
a dispute have a substantial chance of winning and losing, especially 
when their chances may be 49% to 51%, it is reasonable for them to 
settle. That companies with conflicting claims settle drug patent 
litigation in these circumstances is not a violation of the antitrust 
laws. 
Id. at 1313 (citations omitted). 
 98. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“[T]he Laws of the United 
States . . . shall be the Supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every 
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the . . . Laws of any State to the 
Contrary notwithstanding.”); Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve, 
Introduction: Preemption in Context, in FEDERAL PREEMPTION: STATES’ 
POWERS, NATIONAL INTERESTS 1, 3 (Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve 
eds., 2007). 
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the U.S. Constitution’s Supremacy Clause, federal law reigns 
supreme and hence preempts any conflicting law or law that 
federal legislation deems preempted.”99 The doctrine may be 
understood as encompassing three basic types of preemption: 
express, field, and conflict or obstacle.100 
Express preemption exists where Congress has included a 
provision in legislation stipulating that states may not exercise 
a given power.101 The Patent Act does not contain an express 
preemption provision,102 unlike other areas of intellectual 
property (IP) law.103 
Field preemption refers to an implicit intent of Congress 
that federal regulation has completely occupied an area of law, 
such that state regulation of the same area is impermissible.104 
Though the history and current status of the doctrine has been 
convoluted,105 perhaps the clearest statement of the doctrine 
                                                          
 99. William W. Buzbee, Introduction, in PREEMPTION CHOICE: THE 
THEORY, LAW, AND REALITY OF FEDERALISM’S CORE QUESTION 1 (William W. 
Buzbee ed., 2008). 
 100. See, e.g., Ralph F. Hall & Michelle Mercer, Rethinking Lohr: Does 
“SE” Mean Safe and Effective, Substantially Equivalent, or Both?, 13 MINN. J. 
L. SCI. & TECH. 737, 755 (2012); Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 
226 (2000). Preemption may be divided into taxonomies different than the one 
given above. See Epstein & Greve, supra note 98, at 18; KENNETH STARR ET 
AL., THE LAW OF PREEMPTION: A REPORT OF THE APPELLATE JUDGES 
CONFERENCE, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 14–34 (1991). 
 101. See Nelson, supra note 100, at 227. 
 102. Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. Harmonic Design, Inc., 153 F.3d 1318, 1332 
(Fed. Cir. 1998) (“[F]ederal patent law plainly does not provide for explicit 
preemption . . . .”); 1 HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 6, at 5-41. 
 103. The Copyright Act does include an express preemption provision, 17 
U.S.C. § 301 (2006). 1 HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 6, at 5-43. The provision 
states that “all legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the 
exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright . . . are governed 
exclusively by this title. Thereafter, no person is entitled to any such right or 
equivalent right in any such work under the common law or statutes of any 
State.” 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2006). For an analysis of conflicting interpretations 
of this statute, see Thomas F. Cotter & Irina Y. Dmitrieva, Integrating the 
Right of Publicity with First Amendment and Copyright Preemption Analysis, 
33 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 165, 181–88 (2010). 
 104. See Nelson, supra note 100, at 227. Both field preemption and conflict 
preemption can be considered to fall under a broader category of “implied” 
preemption, where, in the absence of an explicit provision in a statute, 
Congress’s intent that federal law displaces state law is implied. Cf. STARR ET 
AL., supra note 100, at 18–30 (classifying “occupation of the field” and 
“obstacle preemption” as types of “implied preemption”). 
 105. Cf. Young, supra note 12, at 255 (“Most observers consider the law in 
this area to be, in the words of a leading practitioner, ‘a muddle.’”). 
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came from the 1947 case, Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator.106 In Rice, 
Justice Douglas suggested state law is preempted where 
federal law is “so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference 
that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it” or it 
may “touch a field in which the federal interest is so dominant 
that the federal system will be assumed to preclude 
enforcement of state laws on the same subject.”107 Field 
preemption may also be described as “jurisdictional” 
preemption, the idea that jurisdictional rules exist that prohibit 
states from regulating certain fields.108 
Finally, conflict preemption arises when the state law 
“stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of 
the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”109 Justice 
Douglas classified conflict preemption as two separate 
categories: obstacle preemption, where “the object sought to be 
obtained by the federal law and the character of obligations 
imposed by it may reveal the same purpose,” and conflict 
preemption, where “the state policy may produce a result 
inconsistent with the objective of the federal statute.”110 One 
scholar characterizes the test courts should apply as follows: 
“Courts are required to disregard state law if, but only if, it 
contradicts a rule validly established by federal law.”111 
The Supreme Court has frustrated courts and scholars 
through its inconsistent application and interpretation of the 
preemption doctrine.112 Further, the Court has decided only a 
handful of decisions regarding preemption of federal patent 
law.113 These decisions provide the only Supreme Court 
                                                          
 106. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator, 331 U.S. 218 (1947). 
 107. Id. at 230. 
 108. Nelson, supra note 100, at 261–62. 
 109. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). An alternative taxonomy 
of federal preemption comprises express preemption and implied preemption, 
wherein implied preemption includes jurisdictional, or field preemption, and 
obstacle preemption. See, e.g., John E. Mauk, Note, The Slippery Slope of 
Secrecy: Why Patent Law Preempts Reverse-Engineering Clauses in Shrink-
Wrap Licenses, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 819, 830–31 (2001); supra note 104. 
 110. Rice, 331 U.S. at 230. 
 111. Nelson, supra note 100, at 260. Nelson refers to this as the “logical-
contradiction” test. Id. 
 112. Cf. id. at 262; Young, supra note 12, at 255. 
 113. See generally Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 
141 (1989); Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicorn Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974); Compco 
Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. 
Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964). 
MARSILI_PROOF(DO NOT DELETE) 7/12/2013  12:02 PM 
2013] STATE CHALLENGES TO PAY-FOR-DELAY  867 
guidance on the preemptive effect of patent law, which are 
outlined in Part I.B.2 below, along with relevant case law from 
the CAFC. Though these decisions concern whether patent law 
preempts various state laws, it is important to note that the 
Court has not considered whether federal patent law preempts 
state antitrust law. CAFC had the opportunity in Zenith 
Electronics Corp. v. Exzec, Inc. to decide if federal antitrust law 
may be “preempted” by federal patent laws.114 There is a basic 
argument that “a given federal antitrust challenge to the 
exercise of federally-created intellectual property rights cannot 
be countenanced because the antitrust challenge conflicts with, 
and should be deemed ‘preempted’ by, the intellectual property 
rights regime.”115 Yet CAFC declined to find any preemption 
among federal intellectual property  and antitrust law, instead 
finding that when two federal laws conflict, a court must 
“interpret and apply them ‘in a way that preserves the 
purposes of both and fosters harmony between them.’”116 
2. Supreme Court and CAFC Case Law Addressing Preemption 
of Federal Patent Law 
The Supreme Court has decided a few cases which address 
the question of preemption of federal patent law over various 
state laws.117 In an early pair of cases, the Court found that 
state competition laws are preempted when they attempt to 
create patent-like rights for products in the public domain.118 
In Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co.,119 the Court held that 
state unfair competition law could not impose liability for 
copying of the design of a lamp that was not protected by 
federal patent law.120 The Court reasoned that a state could not 
evade the requirements of federal patent law by using unfair 
competition law to provide protection to an unpatented 
                                                          
 114. See Zenith Electronics Corp. v. Exzec, Inc., 182 F.3d 1340, 1342 (Fed. 
Cir. 1999); 1 HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 6, at 5-48. 
 115. 1 HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 6, at 5-48. 
 116. Zenith, 182 F.3d at 1347 (quoting Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc. v. 
Duracraft Corp., 58 F.3d 1498, 1507 (10th Cir. 1995)). 
 117. See BARTON BEEBE ET AL., TRADEMARK, UNFAIR COMPETITION, AND 
BUSINESS TORTS 805–17 (2011). 
 118. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 225 (1964); Compco 
Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 234 (1964); see infra notes 
119–123 and accompanying text. 
 119. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964). 
 120. Id. at 232–33. 
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product.121 In Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc.,122 the 
Court held that though state laws may not prohibit copying and 
selling of unpatented products, states may enforce laws that  
require proper identification of the source of the copied 
products.123 
After Sears and Compco, the Court decided a case 
involving preemption of federal copyright law, Goldstein v. 
California, and found that a state statute criminalizing piracy 
of sound recordings (which was not a protected work under the 
Copyright Act at that time) was not preempted by federal 
copyright law.124 The Court reasoned that, whereas in Sears 
and Compco the state laws were “to prevent the copying of 
articles which did not meet the requirements for federal 
protection,” a similar conflict didn’t exist in this case because 
“[i]n regard to this category of ‘Writings,’ Congress has drawn 
no balance; rather, it has left the area unattended, and no 
reason exists why the State should not be free to act.”125 
The Court again deferred to state law in a case involving a 
claim of preemption of state trade secret law. In Kewanee Oil 
Co. v. Bicron Corp.,126 the Court found that state trade secret 
laws are not preempted by federal patent law,127 reasoning that 
the important question in determining federal patent 
preemption is whether the state law in question conflicts with 
the operation of the Patent Act.128 Significantly, the Court 
announced a test for determining whether a given state law 
conflicts with the purposes of federal patent law: 
First, patent law seeks to foster and reward invention; second, it 
promotes disclosure of inventions, to stimulate further innovation and 
to permit the public to practice the invention once the patent expires; 
third, the stringent requirements for patent protection seek to assure 
                                                          
 121. Id. at 231–32 (“To allow a State by use of its law of unfair competition 
to prevent the copying of an article which represents too slight an advance to 
be patented would be to permit the State to block off from the public 
something which federal law has said belongs to the public.”). 
 122. Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964). 
 123. Id. at 238. 
 124. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 571 (1973) (“We conclude that 
the State of California has exercised a power which it retained under the 
Constitution, and that the challenged statute, as applied in this case, does not 
intrude into an area which Congress has, up to now, pre-empted.”). 
 125. Id. at 569–70. 
 126. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974). 
 127. Id. at 491–92. 
 128. Id. at 479. 
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that ideas in the public domain remain there for the free use of the 
public.129 
The Court noted that trade secret law protects items which 
would not be proper subjects for consideration for patent 
protection,130 that having two systems that both support 
innovation will not be in conflict,131 and that in cases where a 
product is patentable, it is unlikely that an inventor would opt 
for the lesser protections provided by trade secret laws just to 
avoid disclosure.132 
Finally, in Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Draft Boats, 
Inc.,133 the Court held that a state law may not restrict the 
public’s ability to exploit an unpatented design,134 and that the 
state had, in effect, created a monopoly, which encroached on 
Congress’s power to regulate patent law.135 In finding the state 
law to be preempted,136 the court distinguished Kewanee Oil 
based on the differences in protection offered by trade secret 
law, versus the “patent like” rights awarded by the state law in 
Bonito Boats.137 
In the late nineties, the CAFC decided a series of cases 
regarding federal patent preemption of state business tort and 
unfair competition claims.138 In Dow Chemical Co. v. Exxon 
Corp., the CAFC held that a state unfair competition claim 
alleging intentional interference with contractual relations, 
based on a patentee’s inequitable conduct before the United 
States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO),139 was not 
preempted by federal patent law.140 The court reasoned that 
                                                          
 129. Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979) 
(interpreting Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974)). 
 130. Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 482. 
 131. Id. at 484. 
 132. Id. at 490. 
 133. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Draft Boats, 489 U.S. 141 (1989). 
 134. Id. at 168. 
 135. Id. at 167 (“The Florida law substantially restricts the public’s ability 
to exploit an unpatented design in general circulation, raising the specter of 
state-created monopolies in a host of useful shapes and processes for which 
patent protection has been denied or is otherwise unobtainable.”). 
 136. Id. at 168. 
 137. Id. at 156–57 (“[S]tates may not offer patent-like protection to 
intellectual creations which would otherwise remain unprotected as a matter 
of federal law.”). 
 138. Zenith Electronics Corp. v. Exzec, Inc., 182 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 1999); 
Dow Chemical Co. v. Exxon Corp., 139 F.3d 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Hunter 
Douglas, Inc. v. Harmonic Design, Inc,. 153 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 139. Dow Chemical, 139 F.3d at 1472. 
 140. Id. at 1479. 
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the state law wasn’t preempted because it “does not stand as an 
impermissible obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of 
the patent laws and because the cause of action requires 
entirely different elements from the defense of inequitable 
conduct under the federal patent laws.”141 
However, the CAFC reached a different conclusion in 
Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. Harmonic Design when it held that  
state commercial disparagement claims are preempted by 
federal patent law in cases where the state law claim depends 
on the patent holder’s conduct before the PTO and the plaintiff 
fails to allege fraud or bad faith in obtaining the patent.142 
Since federal patent law already addresses these issues, CAFC 
reasoned, a showing of bad faith is required in order to avoid 
preemption.143 
As mentioned in Part I.B.1, supra, the CAFC declined to 
acknowledge a formal preemption between conflicting federal 
laws in Zenith Electronics, finding that neither federal 
antitrust law nor federal patent law preempted a federal unfair 
competition claim.144 
The Supreme Court’s and the CAFC’s rulings regarding 
preemption of federal patent law, though not expansive, are 
instructive and provide guidance as to how courts might apply 
the doctrine of preemption to cases where pay-for-delay 
settlements are challenged in state courts under state antitrust 
laws. One such case is pending hearing in the Supreme Court 
of California, and invites the application of preemption 
analysis.145 
3. Case Study: In re Cipro Cases I & II 
In February 2012, the California Supreme Court granted 
review for In re Cipro Cases I & II (the Cipro Cases).146 This is 
presently the first and only challenge to a pay-for-delay 
                                                          
 141. Id. at 1478–79. 
 142. Hunter Douglas, 153 F.3d at 1336. 
 143. Id. The CAFC distinguished Dow, suggesting that it “is in harmony 
with this conduct-based approach. In that case, because the plaintiff alleged 
the bad faith enforcement of a patent, the state law torts were not preempted.” 
Id. at 1337 (citations omitted). 
 144. Zenith Electronics Corp. v. Exzec, Inc., 182 F.3d 1340, 1351–55 (Fed. 
Cir. 1999). 
 145. In re Cipro Cases I & II, 200 Cal. App. 4th 442 (2011), rev. granted, 
269 P.3d 653 (Cal. 2012). 
 146. Yeung, supra note 11. 
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settlement brought in a state court.147 One of the issues to be 
presented upon review is whether “the facts of this case 
demonstrating egregious patent misuse in the form of a large 
cash payment, made to head off likely invalidation, that drove 
up prescription drug prices in an area critical to social welfare, 
preclude federal preemption of California law . . . .”148 Thus, the 
California Supreme Court may directly decide this issue. 
The court will be reviewing the decision of the California 
Court of Appeal for the Fourth District.149 The case, like pay-
for-delay challenges brought in federal courts, involves a 
pioneering company, Bayer, which concluded settlement 
agreements with several generic companies stipulating that the 
generics would delay entry to the market, and requiring 
payments to one of the generics, Barr, amounting to nearly 
$400 million.150 Bayer’s patent for the ciprofloxacin 
hydrochloride molecule, the active ingredient in Cipro,151 was 
confirmed to be valid upon reexamination152 and in further 
ANDA challenges subsequent to the initial settlements.153 
Direct and indirect purchasers initiated federal litigation 
challenging the settlements in 2000 and 2001; all the litigation 
ultimately favored the pharmaceutical companies, finding that 
the agreements were within the exclusionary scope of the 
                                                          
 147. Id. 
 148. Petition for Review at 1, In re Cipro Cases I & II, 200 Cal. App. 4th 
442 (Dec. 18, 2011) (No. S198616). The petitioner argues that the California 
Court of Appeal wrongly decided that federal patent law preempts California 
antitrust law and that this ruling will completely prevent state courts from 
hearing patent disputes. Id. at 20. 
 149. In re Cipro Cases I & II, 200 Cal. App. 4th 442 (2011), rev. granted, 
269 P.3d 653 (Cal. 2012). 
 150. Id. at 451. 
 151. Cipro is “an antibiotic prescribed for the treatment of infections.” Id. 
at 448. 
 152. Reexamination is a process which Congress implemented in 1980, 
which was meant to improve the quality of patents by allowing the validity of 
patents to be revisited by the PTO without recourse to litigation. See MERGES 
& DUFFY, supra note 14, at 1099. The process was codified in the Patent Act 
under 35 U.S.C. §§ 301–07 (ex parte reexamination) and 35 U.S.C. §§ 311–18 
(inter partes reexamination, added in 1999). Id. However, the reexamination 
process was revised in the America Invents Act, and now comprises new post-
grant and inter partes review proceedings and ex parte reexamination. See 
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011); 
Matthew C. Phillips & Kevin B. Laurence, Changes to Reexamination Under 
the America Invents Act, INTELLECTUAL PROP. TODAY, Nov. 2011,  at 22, 22–
23. 
 153. Cipro Cases, 200 Cal. App. 4th at 451–52. 
MARSILI_PROOF(DO NOT DELETE) 7/12/2013  12:02 PM 
872 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 14:2 
 
 
patent and therefore were not in violation of antitrust laws.154 
The plaintiffs in this case, state residents and nonprofit 
organizations, claimed that the settlements were per se illegal 
under the Cartwright Act as an unreasonable restraint on 
trade.155 The court analyzed the reasoning of federal challenges 
to pay-for-delay settlements, and concluded that “unless a 
patent was procured by fraud, or a suit for its enforcement was 
objectively baseless, a settlement of the enforcement suit does 
not violate the Cartwright Act if the settlement restrains 
competition only within the scope of the patent.”156 
The court further employed the doctrine of preemption to 
analyze plaintiffs’ sham litigation claim.157 The plaintiffs 
argued that Bayer procured its patent through inequitable 
conduct, and that Bayer’s infringement suit was therefore 
objectively baseless.158 The California Court of Appeal 
concluded that the plaintiffs’ sham litigation claim was 
preempted by federal patent law, based on a theory of field (or 
“jurisdictional”) preemption; the court reasoned that federal 
courts have original jurisdiction when “the plaintiff’s right to 
relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial 
question of federal patent law, in that patent law is a necessary 
element of one of the well-pleaded claims.”159 The California 
Court of Appeals also rejected plaintiffs’ argument that a state 
court may decide patent issues that are ancillary to the main 
                                                          
 154. Id. at 452–54. 
 155. Id. at 456. 
 156. Id. at 467. 
 157. A sham litigation claim requires a plaintiff to show “(1) ‘the lawsuit 
[to] be objectively baseless in the sense that no reasonable litigant could 
realistically expect success on the merits,’ and (2) that the litigant’s ‘subjective 
motivation’ for bringing the action was a sham seeking to conceal a knowing 
attempt to interfere with a competitor.” Id. at 470 (quoting In re Ciprofloxacin 
Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d 514, 547 (E.D.N.Y. 2005)). The 
court looked only at jurisdictional, or field preemption, but the parties 
addressed the possibility of preemption in their briefs, which is reviewed in 
detail in Part II, infra. The court declined to address substantive or “conflict” 
preemption in its opinion. Id. at 470–77. 
 158. See id. at 470. “Objectively baseless” refers to sham litigation, 
described in note 157, supra. 
 159. See id. at 473 (quoting Holiday Matinee, Inc. v. Rambus, Inc., 118 Cal. 
App. 4th 1413, 1422 (2004)). The Court of Appeal specifically reasoned that, 
because plaintiffs’ claim of an objectively baseless suit depended on a question 
of federal patent law (the question of whether Bayer procured its patent 
through inequitable conduct), the claim was preempted by patent law. See id. 
at 473. 
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claim, finding that plaintiffs’ claims in fact depended on an 
issue of patent law.160 
The California Court of Appeal’s conclusion that the 
plaintiffs’ sham litigation claim “arises from and is preempted 
by federal law,”161 invited discussion of preemption in the 
parties’ petitions for review and briefs that followed the 
opinion.162 Though the Court of Appeal only explicitly 
addressed field preemption, briefs filed with the Supreme 
Court of California address substantive preemption (or 
“obstacle preemption”), as discussed in detail in Part II. 
II. THE DOCTRINE OF PREEMPTION APPLIED TO STATE 
ANTITRUST CHALLENGES TO PAY-FOR-DELAY 
SETTLEMENTS 
A. PREEMPTION IN CONTEXT: IN RE CIPRO I & II 
Part I of this Note explored the mechanics of pay-for-delay 
settlements and their legal treatment to date, as well as the 
doctrine of preemption as it has been understood by the 
Supreme Court and scholars. This Part analyzes the 
applicability of the doctrine of preemption to a state law 
challenge to a pay-for-delay settlement, using the Cipro Cases 
as an illustration. That analysis is informed by a general 
framework adapted from the limited case law in this area.163 
Finally, Part II.B, infra, explores policy ramifications of finding 
state antitrust law to be preempted by federal patent law, 
concluding that preemption is inappropriate in this context. 
1. The Doctrine of Preemption 
As described in Part I.B, supra, the doctrine of preemption 
may be divided into three types: express, field, and conflict or 
obstacle.164 The Supreme Court’s pronouncements on 
preemption have tended to lack clarity, and have left room for 
lower and state courts to interpret the doctrine divergently.165 
                                                          
 160. See id. at 475. 
 161. Id. at 477. 
 162. See, e.g., Petition for Review, supra note 148, at 19. 
 163. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 164. Again, different taxonomies exist to describe the types of preemption; 
for the purposes of this analysis, the terms “substantive” and “jurisdictional” 
may also be employed to refer to conflict/obstacle and field preemption, 
respectively. 
 165. See supra note 112 and accompanying text. 
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Regarding the Cipro Cases, field and conflict preemption are 
relevant; as noted in Part II.B, infra, there is no provision in 
the Patent Act requiring preemption, and express preemption 
does not apply.166 However, the text of the relevant patent laws  
and of the state laws at issue in the Cipro Cases will provide a 
framework for the preemption analysis. 
The plaintiffs in the Cipro Cases brought claims under 
section 16720 of the Cartwright Act, California’s antitrust act, 
alleging that “Defendants, and their co-conspirators, entered 
into and engaged in a continuing unlawful trust in restraint of 
the trade and commerce described above in violation of 
California Business and Professions Code section 16720.”167 
The Cartwright Act defines a “trust” as: “a combination of 
capital, skill or acts by two or more persons for any of the 
following purposes: . . . [t]o create or carry out restrictions in 
trade or commerce . . . [t]o prevent competition in 
manufacturing . . . sale or purchase of merchandise, produce or 
any commodity.”168 Plaintiffs alleged that defendants violated 
                                                          
 166. “[F]ederal patent law plainly does not provide for explicit 
preemption . . . .” Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. Harmonic Design, Inc., 153 F.3d 
1318, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 167. Consolidated Second Amended Complaint at 35, In re Cipro Cases I & 
II, 200 Cal. App. 4th 442 (2011), rev. granted, 269 P.3d 653 (Cal. 2012) (Nos. 
4154, 4220). The plaintiffs also brought claims for violation of state unfair 
competition law, CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (West 2012), and common 
law monopolization, but this analysis will focus only on the antitrust 
challenges. 
 168. The full text of  section 16720 reads as follows: 
A trust is a combination of capital, skill or acts by two or more 
persons for any of the following purposes: 
(a) To create or carry out restrictions in trade or commerce. 
(b) To limit or reduce the production, or increase the price of 
merchandise or of any commodity. 
(c) To prevent competition in manufacturing, making, transportation, 
sale or purchase of merchandise, produce or any commodity. 
(d) To fix at any standard or figure, whereby its price to the public or 
consumer shall be in any manner controlled or established, any 
article or commodity of merchandise, produce or commerce intended 
for sale, barter, use or consumption in this State. 
(e) To make or enter into or execute or carry out any contracts, 
obligations, or agreements of any kind or description, by which they 
do all or any or any combination of the following: 
(1) Bind themselves not to sell, dispose of or transport any article or 
any commodity or any article of trade, use, merchandise, commerce or 
consumption below a common standard figure, or fixed value. 
(2) Agree in any manner to keep the price of such article, commodity 
or transportation at a fixed or graduated figure. 
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section 16720 through 
trusts [that] have included concerted action and undertakings among 
the Defendants with the purpose and effect of: (a) allocating the 
entire California market for ciprofloxacin to Bayer; (b) permitting 
Bayer to maintain a monopoly over the California market for 
ciprofloxacin and to charge supra-competitive prices for Cipro, the 
proceeds of which it shares in part with Barr and HMR; (c) precluding 
the introduction of generic ciprofloxacin in California, which would 
have been available to consumers at a cost much lower than Cipro; 
and (d) fixing, raising, maintaining or stabilizing the price of 
ciprofloxacin.169 
The patent laws themselves are not explicit regarding the 
extent of rights that they bestow. But several provisions seem 
relevant to the “scope of the patent” referred to in federal 
circuit court decisions.170 The Patent Act grants patent holders 
a negative property right to “exclude others from making, 
using, offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the 
United States or importing the invention into the United 
States.”171 The patent holder is entitled to a twenty-year term, 
subject to adjustments (including those granted under the 
Hatch-Waxman Act mentioned in Part I.A),172 and the patent is 
entitled to a presumption of validity.173 As noted in Kewanee 
Oil, there is nothing explicit in the text of these laws indicating 
                                                          
(3) Establish or settle the price of any article, commodity or 
transportation between them or themselves and others, so as directly 
or indirectly to preclude a free and unrestricted competition among 
themselves, or any purchasers or consumers in the sale or 
transportation of any such article or commodity. 
(4) Agree to pool, combine or directly or indirectly unite any interests 
that they may have connected with the sale or transportation of any 
such article or commodity, that its price might in any manner be 
affected. 
CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16720 (West 2012). 
 169. Consolidated Second Amended Complaint, supra note 167,  at 37. 
 170. See, e.g., In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 224 
(2d Cir. 2006); In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 363 F. Supp. 
2d 514, 535 (E.D.N.Y. 2005), aff’d in part, 544 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 171. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2006). 
 172. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2006). 
 173. 35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (2006). The full text of the section reads as follows: 
A patent shall be presumed valid. Each claim of a patent (whether in 
independent, dependent, or multiple dependent form) shall be 
presumed valid independently of the validity of other claims; 
dependent or multiple dependent claims shall be presumed valid even 
though dependent upon an invalid claim. The burden of establishing 
invalidity of a patent or any claim thereof shall rest on the party 
asserting such invalidity. 
Id. 
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preemption.174 The question, then, turns to Congress’ purpose 
for enacting the Patent Act, whether it can be implied that the 
Patent Act was meant to foreclose the states’ ability to 
adjudicate matters touching on the patent law, and whether 
the Cartwright Act conflicts with the purposes and objectives of 
the Patent Act. Since the taxonomy of preemption is often 
neither clear nor consistent, analysis of “field” and “conflict” 
preemption may overlap, as the ultimate inquiry relates to 
congressional intent.175 
2. Field Preemption 
The doctrine of field preemption and Supreme Court 
jurisprudence suggest that state courts are competent to 
adjudicate antitrust challenges to pay-for-delay settlements, 
and that state antitrust claims are not preempted by the 
federal patent laws. As mentioned in Part I.B.1, supra, field 
preemption exists where state law “regulates conduct in a field 
that Congress intends the federal government to occupy 
exclusively.”176 In the Cipro Cases, the California Court of 
Appeal reached the issue of preemption, but focused its 
analysis narrowly on jurisdiction, failing to address 
congressional intent.177 As an amicus request for review of the 
Cipro Cases points out, the Court of Appeal used a rule for 
determining exclusive federal jurisdiction rather than applying 
the doctrine of field preemption when it determined that 
plaintiffs’ claims depended on a question of patent law and 
therefore were preempted.178 Questions of jurisdiction may 
                                                          
 174. Cf. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480 (1947) (“The 
patent law does not explicitly endorse or forbid the operation of trade secret 
law.”). 
 175. Nelson, supra note 100, at 263 (“The [Supreme] Court itself 
has . . . conceded that field pre-emption may be understood as a species of 
conflict pre-emption.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 176. Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. Harmonic Design, Inc., 153 F.3d 1318, 1332 
(Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 177. See supra text accompanying note 159. 
 178. See Amicus Curiae Petition for Review at 8, In re Cipro Cases I & II, 
200 Cal. App. 4th 442 (2011), rev. granted, 269 P.3d 653 (Cal. 2012) (No. 
S198616). The California Court of Appeal used 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a), a 
jurisdictional rule requiring exclusive federal subject matter jurisdiction for 
cases where “the plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of 
a substantial question of federal patent law,”  and cited Hunter Douglas as 
supporting this assertion. In re Cipro Cases I & II, 200 Cal. App. 4th 442, 473 
(2011). However, the CAFC’s determination of the jurisdiction issue was 
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evidence a congressional intent that certain matters of federal 
law ought not be determined in state court, but that conclusion 
merely indicates that state court is the improper venue to try 
the question.179 The preemption inquiry asks whether Congress 
has the constitutional power to occupy a particular field 
entirely, such that a state law cannot stand.180 Proper 
jurisdiction is a threshold matter to adjudicating state law 
claims that relate to issues of patent law that are brought in 
state court,181 so it merits discussion. 
As mentioned in Part II.A.1, supra, even though a 
jurisdiction question is not an identical inquiry to field 
preemption, there could be overlap in Congress’s intent that 
certain federal questions are not to be adjudicated in state 
court.182 With that in mind, the court in the Cipro Cases could 
have considered case law that indicates an expansive right of 
the state to adjudicate issues concerning patent law.183 The 
Supreme Court has made it clear that state courts are  
 
                                                          
separate from its preemption analysis, and did not involve an inquiry into 
Congress’s intent regarding the reach of federal patent law. Hunter Douglas, 
153 F.3d at 1324–25. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New 
York similarly applied 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) to find a state Walker Process claim 
preempted by federal patent law. See In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride 
Antitrust Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d 514, 543 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). The court 
referenced the Supreme Court’s interpretation of “what it means for a claim to 
‘arise under’ patent law,” id. (quoting Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating 
Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 809–11 (1988)), and concluded that the claims arose 
under patent law since they required a showing of misconduct before the PTO. 
Id. This argument fails for the same reason the Cipro Cases court’s argument 
fails, as discussed below. 
 179. Cf. Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059, 1062 (2013) (stating that “[t]he 
question presented is whether a state law claim alleging legal malpractice in 
the handling of a patent case must be brought in federal court[,]” and 
concluding that the state law malpractice claim did not arise under federal 
patent law for purposes of  § 1338(a)); id. at 1068. 
 180. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). 
 181. See 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2006) (“No State court shall have jurisdiction 
over any claim for relief arising under any Act of Congress relating to 
patents . . . .”). 
 182. Cf. Hunter Douglas, 153 F.3d at 1329–30 (concluding that a state law 
claim whose outcome turned on the validity and enforceability of a patent 
raised issues of federal patent law that were sufficiently “substantial” to 
confer federal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a)). 
 183. Cf. id. at 1334 (determining the possibility of field preemption of state 
unfair competition claims by federal patent law, and finding that precedent 
showed “the substantial difference between the two fields” and demonstrated 
“that the regulation of business affairs is traditionally a matter for state 
regulation”). 
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competent to decide patent law issues, though the state court 
may not invalidate the issued patent.184 
Perhaps cementing the argument that state courts have 
jurisdiction to hear antitrust claims that involve issues of 
patent law, the Supreme Court’s February 2013 opinion in 
Gunn v. Minton held that 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) “does not deprive 
the state courts of subject matter jurisdiction” in cases where 
the court must answer a question of federal patent law to 
resolve the state claim, but “their answer will have no broader 
effects.”185 The Court adopted the Grable test for determining 
when claims “arise under” federal patent law and must be 
brought in federal court: “federal jurisdiction over a state law 
claim will lie if a federal issue is: (1) necessarily raised, (2) 
actually disputed, (3) substantial, and (4) capable of resolution 
in federal court without disrupting the federal-state balance 
approved by Congress.”186 The Court focused its inquiry on the 
third factor and concluded that, though resolution of a patent 
issue in assessing a state claim may matter to the specific 
parties involved, “something more, demonstrating that the 
question is significant to the federal system as a whole, is 
needed” to preclude state jurisdiction.187 In light of this 
decision, state courts have wide authority to hear state claims 
that depend on resolution of a patent issue—even a 
“substantial” issue like whether plaintiff Minton’s infringement 
claim would have prevailed188—where such resolution lacks 
importance to the federal system as a whole. 
Beyond the question of jurisdiction, further considerations 
could have informed the California Court of Appeal’s field 
preemption determination, and may inform state antitrust 
challenges to pay-for-delay settlements generally. First, the 
Supreme Court’s recent decision in Arizona v. United States 
implies that the doctrine of field preemption may be inapposite 
where the potentially conflicting state and federal law regulate 
                                                          
 184. The Supreme Court has said that “state courts can and regularly do 
adjudicate state claims raising patent law questions.” Reply Brief on the 
Merits at 46, In re Cipro Cases I & II, 200 Cal. App. 4th 442 (2011), rev. 
granted, 269 P.3d 653 (Cal. 2012) (No. S198616). But state courts do not have 
jurisdiction if there is “a substantial question of federal patent law.” Id. at 51. 
 185. Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059, 1068 (2013). 
 186. Id. at 1065. 
 187. Id. at 1068. 
 188. See id. 
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different fields.189 The Court found that “the Federal 
Government has occupied the field of alien registration” and 
held that “[w]here Congress occupies an entire field, as it has in 
the field of alien registration, even complementary state 
regulation is impermissible. Field preemption reflects a 
congressional decision to foreclose any state regulation in the 
area, even if it is parallel to federal standards.”190 In the case of 
pay-for-delay, the area of state regulation is antitrust, a field 
which Congress does not occupy exclusively. In California v. 
ARC America Corp., the Supreme Court held that, in the 
antitrust field, state law will not be preempted by concurrent 
federal antitrust law.191 Further, the Supreme Court has 
evaluated the extent of similarity between the Cartwright Act 
and the Sherman Act, and concluded that the Cartwright Act 
was not, in fact, modeled after the Sherman Act, nor after 
common law, so Sherman Act cases are not dispositive in 
interpreting the Cartwright Act.192 This holding is echoed in 
the reasoning of another court filing for the impending 
Supreme Court of California hearing, which submits that 
defendants depended on federal decisions that interpreted the 
Sherman Act, but that they failed to explain how limitations on 
the Sherman Act would preempt the Cartwright Act.193 This 
illustrates the key point that, though federal antitrust and 
patent laws are formally considered to co-exist, state antitrust 
laws predated their federal counterparts, and may create a 
                                                          
 189. See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2502 (2012). 
 190. Id. The Court further defined the premise of field preemption as the 
idea “that States may not enter, in any respect, an area the Federal 
Government has reserved for itself.” Id. 
 191. Specifically, the Supreme Court held that California’s indirect 
purchaser remedy is not preempted by the Sherman Act, and that “Congress 
intended the federal antitrust laws to supplement, not displace, state antitrust 
remedies.”  California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 102 (1989). 
 192. See ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 70, at 6-4. California 
law has notable differences from Sherman Act cases in the analytical rules it 
applies; for example, the state does recognize a set of practices as per se 
restraints on trade, but its rule of reason differs from federal law in that it 
sparsely applies the “quick look” approach. See id. at 6-9 to 6-10. Further, case 
law has shown that certain provisions of the Cartwright Act may stand where 
they prohibit something that is permitted by the Sherman Act, and the 
Cartwright Act is not preempted by the Sherman Act in such cases. See id. at 
6-32 (citing Turnbull & Turnbull v. ARA Transp., 219 Cal. App. 3d 811 
(1990)). 
 193. See Reply to Answers to Petition for Review at 13, In re Cipro Cases I 
& II, 200 Cal. App. 4th 442 (2011), rev. granted, 269 P.3d 653 (Cal. 2012) (No. 
S198616). 
MARSILI_PROOF(DO NOT DELETE) 7/12/2013  12:02 PM 
880 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 14:2 
 
 
more palpable conflict with federal patent law.194 This 
consideration is applicable in determining the extent to which 
state antitrust laws conflict with federal patent law,195 
discussed in Part II.A.3, infra, as they may not be substantively 
the same as federal antitrust law. 
Next, should a state court adopt the California Court of 
Appeal’s approach by adopting the “scope of the patent” test 
and following its approach to “preemption,” and if a court could 
apply that approach to the question of federal jurisdiction, a 
plaintiff’s claim would always be preempted. In the Cipro 
Cases, the court concluded that plaintiffs’ sham litigation claim 
required a determination of a substantial question of patent 
law and therefore could not be adjudicated in state court.196 In 
its rejection of plaintiffs’ argument that their claims were 
premised on the defendant’s conduct in the settlement 
agreement and not in the procurement of the patent itself,197 
the court’s reasoning is somewhat circular. It first determined 
                                                          
 194. See ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 70, at 6-1 (“The 
California antitrust laws provide a potent alternative to their federal 
counterparts. They often have been accorded broader interpretation by the 
courts . . . .”). 
 195. As mentioned in Part I.B.1, supra, the categories of preemption often 
blur and overlap. In addressing the government’s argument of field 
preemption in Hines v. Davidowitz, Justice Black wrote: 
Little aid can be derived from the vague and illusory but often 
repeated formula that Congress “by occupying the field” has excluded 
from it all state legislation. Every Act of Congress occupies some field, 
but we must know the boundaries of that field before we can say that 
it has precluded a state from the exercise of any power reserved to it 
by the Constitution. To discover the boundaries we look to the federal 
statute itself, read in the light of its constitutional setting and its 
legislative history. 
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 78–79 (1941). The analysis then turned to 
(traditional) conflict preemption. See id. at 79–81. The Court concluded that 
“compliance with the state law does not preclude or even interfere with 
compliance with the act of Congress.” Id. at 81. 
 196. See In re Cipro Cases I & II, 200 Cal. App. 4th 442, 473 (2011), rev. 
granted, 269 P.3d 653 (Cal. 2012). 
 197. Note that even under the district court’s approach in In re 
Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation, this argument may still have 
teeth, as the allegations focus on conduct in settling a patent dispute, not 
conduct in procurement of the patent. In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride 
Antitrust Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d 514 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). Under Minton, this 
claim should not be precluded from state court; even if the claim required the 
court to pass on the question of patent validity, like in Minton, a state court’s 
resolution of a claim involving such a question would not affect the validity of 
the patent. See Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059, 1068 (2013). 
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that the “scope of the patent test” is the correct test to apply 
and that the defendants could only be subject to liability if 
plaintiffs could prove sham litigation, and then concluded that 
the plaintiffs were foreclosed from proving sham litigation 
because such inquiry would require answering substantial 
questions of patent law that cannot be decided in state 
courts.198 Thus, the court has used an incorrect interpretation  
of § 1338(a) to prevent a state claim from prevailing under its 
own test for legality of pay-for-delay settlements. 
Further, the California Court of Appeal did not address the 
presumption against preemption applied by the Supreme Court 
and adopted by California.199 Though the Court’s application of 
the doctrine of preemption has not been incredibly consistent in 
recent years, and it is unclear whether the Court considers Rice 
good law, the Court continues to apply the presumption in some 
cases.200 For example, in a 2008 decision, the majority opinion 
favorably reiterated Rice, stating that “[w]hen addressing 
questions of express or implied pre-emption, we begin our 
analysis ‘with the assumption that the historic police powers of 
the States [are] not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless 
that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.’”201  The 
basis of the presumption against preemption in preserving 
“historic police powers” of states is consistent with the above 
discussion of the reach of state antitrust laws. 
Thus, a field preemption approach to state antitrust law 
challenges to pay-for-delay settlements should take account of 
the jurisdiction question as a threshold issue (when pay-for-
delay settlements are challenged in state court), though Minton 
strongly suggests that state court jurisdiction is permitted. 
Arizona suggests field preemption may be irrelevant when the 
state law is not acting collaterally to federal law, while 
California v. ARC America Corp. teaches that the Sherman Act 
does not preempt the field of antitrust law. In further 
consideration of the presumption against preemption and state 
police powers, it is not clear that Congress intended the federal 
                                                          
 198. Cf. Cipro Cases, 200 Cal. App. 4th at 473–74 (discussing how the 
plaintiff’s claim under state law depended on proving sham litigation, but the 
sham litigation claim was preempted). 
 199. See Petition for Review, supra note 148,  at 22. 
 200. See Young, supra note 12, at 309; see also Nelson, supra note 100, at 
262 (discussing how the Supreme Court has not treated the categories of 
preemption separately). 
 201. Altria Group Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 77 (2008) (alteration in 
original) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)). 
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patent law to so dominate the field that there is neither room 
for the states to decide cases that involve the patent law, nor 
room for states to supplement it.202 
3. Conflict Preemption 
Conflict preemption inquiry requires a determination of 
whether the relevant state law “stands as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and 
objectives of Congress,”203 and “[t]he purpose of Congress is the 
ultimate touchstone” in determining preemption.204 In 
determining whether California law is preempted by federal 
patent law, it is first necessary to identify the potential area of 
conflict, beginning with the language of the statutes 
themselves. 
The primary purpose of the Patent Act, generally stated, is 
to provide inventors with an incentive to innovate and an 
incentive to invest in innovation, by granting a temporary 
monopoly on the specific invention of the patentee.205 The 
Patent Act is founded upon the “IP Clause” of the Constitution, 
which gives Congress the power “[t]o promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times 
to . . . Inventors the exclusive Right to their . . . Discoveries.”206 
With this basic premise in place, the question of conflict 
preemption turns on whether laws that challenge pay-for-delay 
settlements conflict with Congress’s objectives for the patent 
laws.207 
The Supreme Court has provided guidance on the question, 
though not in the context of pay-for-delay settlements. As 
illustrated in Part I.B.2, supra, the Supreme Court’s patent 
(and copyright) preemption cases all involved state laws that 
attempted to provide protection for Intellectual Property (IP).208 
                                                          
 202. See supra notes 182-84 and accompanying text. 
 203. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). 
 204. Retail Clerks Int’l Ass’n. v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963). 
 205. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480–81 (1974); see 
also R. CARL MOY, MOY’S WALKER ON PATENTS, at 1-79 (4th ed. 2012) 
(suggesting that the “increased incentive to invent that the expectation of 
patenting creates” is the primary benefit of the patent system). 
 206. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 207. See Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 479 (“The only limitation on the States is 
that in regulating the area of patents and copyrights they do not conflict with 
the operation of the laws in this area passed by Congress . . . .”). 
 208. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 145 
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In the cases where the court found preemption, the state law 
was protecting conduct that created monopolies in 
manufacture, use, or sale of IP—conduct that is regulated by 
the Patent Act but which, in these cases, failed to meet the 
requirements of the Patent Act. Where the Court found state 
laws could stand, the laws were offering protection for IP that 
was alternative or collateral to federal law.209 In contrast, 
antitrust laws protect competition and consumer welfare by 
regulating monopoly power, with the exception of legal 
monopolies that are provided by IP law.210 Though the Supreme 
Court’s preemption cases provide an imperfect analogy, the 
Court’s reasoning should extend to substantive conflict with 
federal patent law generally.211 
In Kewanee Oil, the Court identified three purposes of the 
patent law that must be considered in determining whether the 
state law “clashes with the objectives of the federal patent 
laws”:212 creating an incentive for inventors, ensuring that the 
invention is disclosed to the public, and ensuring that 
inventions that enter the public domain cannot leave the public 
domain.213 The Court in Bonito Boats refined this test, 
determining that a state law is preempted if it “substantially 
interferes with” or “substantially impedes” one of the Kewanee 
Oil objectives of federal patent law.214 Under this test, the 
Cipro Cases’ plaintiffs’ claims under the Cartwright Act may be 
                                                          
(1989); Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 237–38 (1964); 
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 225 (1964). 
 209. Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 491–92; Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 
546, 571 (1973). 
 210. See supra Part I.A.3. 
 211. See Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. Harmonic Design, Inc., 153 F.3d 1318, 
1333 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (reasoning that, though the Supreme Court IP 
preemption jurisprudence was not perfectly analogous, “it sets forth the 
essential criteria” for analyzing preemption); cf. Cotter & Dmitrieva, supra 
note 103, at 181 n.106 (discussing how the broader principle from Bonito Boats 
should be “that state laws that substantially interfere with the federal patent 
or copyright scheme are preempted”). 
 212. Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 480 (quoting Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel 
Co., 376 U.S. 225, 231 (1964)). 
 213. See id. at 480–81. 
 214. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 156–57 
(1989). In this case the Court focused on the objective of ensuring that 
inventions unworthy of federal patent protection remain in the public domain 
for all to use. See id. at 156. For analysis of a “substantial interference” 
standard applied in the context of preemption of state right of publicity law by 
federal copyright law, see Cotter & Dmitrieva, supra note 103, at 181 n.106, 
208–18. 
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preempted by the federal patent law if the relevant provisions 
of the Cartwright Act stand as an obstacle to one of the three 
patent law objectives. 
The second two purposes of the Kewanee Oil test are 
clearer questions. As CAFC stated in Hunter Douglas, “[Patent 
law] promotes disclosure of inventions to stimulate further 
innovation and to permit the public to practice the invention 
once the patent expires.”215 This policy objective is aligned with 
the purpose of the Hatch-Waxman Act to expedite the entry of 
generic versions of already-disclosed patented drugs to market 
upon expiration of the patent.216 A state antitrust challenge to 
a patent infringement settlement of a patented (and therefore 
disclosed) drug could only promote this objective by attempting 
to remedy the harms of delayed availability of generic drugs to 
the market. The contested litigation itself, in which a generic 
company has created a bioequivalent version of the patented 
drug, suggests that the invention has been disclosed and has 
sufficiently enabled one skilled in the art to recreate the 
patented drug. Likewise, state law challenges to pay-for-delay 
settlements create no conceivable threat of removing a 
patented and publicly disclosed drug from the public domain—
these challenges would have the opposite purpose: preventing 
the extension of the patent monopoly. 
More complex is the question whether state antitrust 
challenges to patent litigation settlements will affect the patent 
law’s ability to incentivize pharmaceutical innovation. This 
inquiry could be broken down into two issues: whether patent 
protection really incentivizes invention of new drugs, and 
whether challenges to patent litigation settlements have any 
effect on the patent laws’ ability to incentivize invention of new 
drugs. 
Some scholars of patent reform argue that there is no proof 
that patents incentivize invention.217 However, the 
pharmaceutical industry has been considered to be an 
                                                          
 215. Hunter Douglas, 153 F.3d at 1333. 
 216. See supra Part I.A.1. 
 217. See Liza Vertinsky, An Organizational Approach to the Design of 
Patent Law, 13 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 211, 224–25 (2012); Michele Boldrin 
& David K. Levine, The Case Against Patents 1 (Fed. Reserve Bank of St. 
Louis Research Div., Working Paper No. 2012-035A, 2012), available at 
http://research.stlouisfed.org/wp/2012/2012-035.pdf. 
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exceptional case.218 Pharmaceutical research is hugely 
expensive and economically risky,219 requiring immense 
investment, both public and private.220 Pharmaceutical 
innovation is largely dependent on expected revenue, but the 
extent to which the patent incentive causes innovation is 
uncertain.221 On one hand, without the incentives of the patent 
system, drug development may still take place, since much 
drug development research is publicly subsidized because it is 
in the public’s interest.222 Without patent law as an incentive, 
new drugs may still be developed, but offered at a lower price to 
consumers since the drug would not have the exclusionary 
protection of a patent, yet could still be reverse engineered by 
competitors.223 On the other hand, studies have shown that 
patents do, in fact, play an important role in pharmaceutical 
innovation.224 Additionally, the structure of pay-for-delay 
settlements reveals the importance to drug companies of patent 
protection; the payment avoids the risk of losing patent 
protection through invalidation.225 Thus, it is uncertain 
whether drug development would be chilled in the absence of 
the patent laws. 
Even assuming that patents incentivize new drug 
development, it is unlikely that allowing challenges to pay-for-
delay settlements would affect the patent laws’ ability to 
                                                          
 218. See F.M. Scherer, The Political Economy of Patent Reform in the 
United States, 7 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 167, 184 (2009) (“[P]atents 
are of special importance to pharmaceutical (and related biopharmaceutical) 
companies, in part because they provide strong protection from competitive 
imitation on products that often have relatively inelastic demands.”). 
 219. See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 
IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 2 (2006). 
 220. See id. at 27. 
 221. See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, PHARMACEUTICAL R&D AND 
THE EVOLVING MARKET FOR PRESCRIPTION DRUGS 1–2  (2009). The 
introduction of new drugs has declined since 2000, id. at 2, while pay-for-delay 
settlements have sharply increased in recent years. See supra notes 47–48 and 
accompanying text. Though only a correlation, it appears the availability or 
supposed legality of pay-for-delay settlements is not incentivizing 
pharmaceutical innovation. 
 222. See generally Boldrin & Levine, supra note 217, at 4–5 (discussing the 
role of patent law in the pharmaceutical industry). 
 223. See id. 
 224. See Scherer, supra note 218, at 173–76. In several surveys, 
respondents from the pharmaceutical industry found patent protection to be 
more important in curbing competition than respondents in other R&D fields. 
See id. 
 225. See supra Part I.A.4. 
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incentivize new drug development. Some courts have 
acknowledged the possibility that “exposing patent activity to 
wider antitrust scrutiny would weaken the incentives 
underlying the patent system, thereby depriving consumers of 
beneficial products.”226 Commentators have also expressed 
concern that antitrust liability in the context of pay-for-delay 
may stifle innovation.227 However, whatever effect potential 
antitrust liability for anticompetitive settlements has on 
incentives to create new drugs, this effect should be viewed on 
balance with the harmful effects of the settlements on 
competition and innovation.228 
Allowing state antitrust challenges to pay-for-delay 
settlements potentially bears little connection to whether a 
drug company will invent. As urged in a Reply Brief on the 
Merits in the Cipro Cases, the belief that pay-for-delay 
settlements will not be challenged will stifle real innovation by 
“encouraging drug companies to place more reliance on the 
least innovative patents.”229 In Dow Chemical, the CAFC, 
applied the Kewanee Oil analysis to a state unfair competition 
claim of contract interference by a patent holder.230 The CAFC 
found that the state claims in no way interfered with the 
objectives of the patent system identified in Kewanee Oil, 
                                                          
 226. Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1186 
(1st Cir. 1994); see also C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1372 
(Fed. Cir. 1998) (“[A]ntitrust jurisprudence has well understood that the  
enforcement of the antitrust laws is self-defeating if it chills or stifles 
innovation.”). 
 227. See Sheila Kadura, Is an Absolute Ban on Reverse Payments the 
Appropriate Way to Prevent Anticompetitive Agreements Between Branded- 
and Generic-Pharmaceutical Companies?, 86 TEX. L. REV. 647, 664–65 (2008) 
(“Clearly, generic products save consumers money, but it is important to 
remember that such products cannot exist unless a branded-pharmaceutical 
product is first developed and shown to be safe and effective, which is an 
expensive endeavor. The decreased certainty that accompanies increased 
litigation may be particularly troublesome in the context of pharmaceutical 
innovation because the pharmaceutical industry relies heavily on a strong 
patent system to attract investors due to the high cost and risk associated 
with drug development.” (citations omitted)). 
 228. See generally Christopher R. Leslie, Antitrust and Patent Law as 
Component Parts of Innovation Policy, 34 J. CORP. L. 1259, 1269–85 (2009) 
(discussing conduct of patent-holders that stifles innovation, and arguing that 
antitrust law fills gaps where patent law fails to curtail innovation-stifling 
conduct of patentees). 
 229. Reply Brief on the Merits, supra note 184, at 49. 
 230. See Dow Chemical Co. v. Exxon Corp., 139 F.3d 1470, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 
1998). 
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declaring, “[I]t seems most improbable that an inventor would 
choose to forfeit the benefits of patent protection because of fear 
of the risk of being found tortiously liable based upon 
attempting to enforce a patent obtained by inequitable 
conduct.”231 This conveys a sentiment that innovation is 
unaffected by concerns that any resulting invention may 
subsequently become the subject of patent litigation which 
results in a settlement that could potentially raise antitrust 
questions—such a connection seems too attenuated. Even if 
innovation were so affected, antitrust liability should be 
balanced by the potential of pay-for-delay settlements to stifle 
innovation. The Kewanee Oil test thus appears to weigh on the 
side of no preemption. 
The line of CAFC cases described in Part I.B.2, supra, 
provides a better analogy to state antitrust challenges to pay-
for-delay settlements than the Supreme Court preemption 
cases—the CAFC cases involve state claims that challenge 
anticompetitive conduct of patent holders,232 as opposed to 
challenges to state laws that created patent-like (or copyright-
like, in the case of Goldstein) protection for unpatentable 
products. In Hunter Douglas, the CAFC created a rule for 
determining whether a state commercial disparagement claim 
(which, like an antitrust claim, involves the assertion of 
conduct on the part of a patentee that restricts competition) is 
preempted by federal patent law: 
To determine whether these state law torts are in conflict with federal 
patent law and accordingly preempted, we assess a defendant’s 
allegedly tortious conduct. If a plaintiff bases its tort action on 
conduct that is protected or governed by federal patent law, then the 
plaintiff may not invoke the state law remedy, which must be 
preempted for conflict with federal patent law. Conversely, if the 
conduct is not so protected or governed, then the remedy is not 
preempted. This approach, which considers whether a state law tort, 
“as-applied,” conflicts with federal patent law, is consistent with that 
employed by the Supreme Court in cases involving preemption of 
state unfair competition law.233 
To summarize, a state law claim in this context will be 
preempted if the challenged conduct is “protected or governed 
                                                          
 231. Id. at 1475; see also Reply Brief on the Merits, supra note 184, at 49–
50 (quoting Dow Chemical Co. v. Exxon Corp., 139 F.3d 1470, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 
1998)). 
 232. See supra notes 138–44 and accompanying text. 
 233. Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. Harmonic Design, Inc., 153 F.3d 1318, 1335 
(Fed. Cir. 1998). 
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by federal patent law.”234 Here, the CAFC found that patent 
law immunizes a patent holder from “imposition of liability for 
conduct before the PTO unless the plaintiff can show that the 
patent-holder’s conduct amounted to fraud or rendered the 
patent application process a sham” and that patent law also 
“bars the imposition of liability for publicizing a patent in the 
marketplace unless the plaintiff can show that the patent-
holder acted in bad faith.”235 Unfortunately, in the context of 
pay-for-delay, this rule serves to return analysis to the debate 
of whether a reverse payment settlement is “protected or 
governed by federal patent law.” This essentially amounts to 
the “scope of the patent” test: whether paying a competitor to 
delay entry to the market is conduct falling within the 
exclusionary scope of the patent.236 On the other hand, Dow 
Chemical and Hunter Douglas suggest that an allegation of bad 
faith will at least save a state claim from automatic 
preemption, and proceed to a determination of the merits of the 
claim.237 This element of bad faith may not be relevant to state 
pay-for-delay challenges. First, early pay-for-delay-challenge 
defendants failed to convince courts that their settlement 
agreements should be immune to antitrust scrutiny under the 
Noerr-Pennington Doctrine.238 Since the doctrine doesn’t apply, 
                                                          
 234. Id. 
 235. Id. at 1336. The CAFC concluded that when a plaintiff’s claims 
depend on a patent holder’s “conduct in obtaining and publicizing its patent, if 
the plaintiff were to fail to allege that the defendant patent-holder was guilty 
of fraudulent conduct before the PTO or bad faith in the publication of a 
patent, then the complaint” would be preempted. Id. Similarly, in Zenith 
Electronics, the CAFC held that “bad faith is a prerequisite to [plaintiff’s] 
state-law tortious interference claim; without it, the claim is preempted by 
patent law.” Zenith Electronics Corp. v. Exzec, Inc., 182 F.3d 1340, 1355 (Fed. 
Cir. 1999). 
 236. See supra Part I.A.4. 
 237. See Dow Chemical Co. v. Exxon Corp., 139 F.3d 1470, 1477 (Fed. Cir. 
1998) (“Bad faith . . . is only one of three elements that must be established to 
make out the tort.”); Hunter Douglas, 153 F.3d at 1336; In re Ciprofloxacin 
Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d 514, 544 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) 
(“[F]ederal patent law preempts any state antitrust cause of action premised 
on Bayer’s alleged bad faith conduct before the PTO because Count V does not 
allege any conduct other than conduct before the PTO. In other words, the 
state law remedies invoked by indirect plaintiffs are directed to allegedly 
tortious conduct before the PTO, not tortious conduct in the marketplace.”). 
 238. See 1 HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 6, at 15-31. The Noerr-
Pennington Doctrine shields conduct that can be regarded as petitioning the 
government (and thereby protected by the First Amendment) from antitrust 
immunity. LESLIE, supra note 5, at 111–13. The doctrine arguably does not 
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the allegation of bad faith, a requisite of the sham petitioning 
exception to Noerr immunity, is unnecessary.239 Further, 
whatever the CAFC’s reason for requiring an allegation of bad 
faith to avoid federal preemption in state business tort and 
commercial disparagement claims, state courts are not obliged 
to follow suit. 
The above analysis provides a basic framework to 
determine whether state antitrust claims are preempted by 
federal patent law in pay-for-delay settlements. State courts 
facing such preemption claims should first consider whether 
state antitrust challenges to pay-for-delay settlements 
substantially interfere with or impede Congress’s objective to 
incentivize innovation in the pharmaceutical industry.240 Next, 
state courts should consider whether the challenged conduct is 
protected or governed by federal patent law—where the 
“conduct” is a reverse payment settlement, the preemption 
question would pose merely a threshold inquiry to a court’s 
consideration of the legality of reverse payment settlements. 
Dow Chemical and Hunter Douglas teach that a plaintiff must 
allege bad faith to avoid preemption of a claim “protected or 
governed” by federal patent law, though this requirement may 
not be particularly relevant to state antitrust challenges to pay-
for-delay settlements. Thus, it appears state antitrust claims 
are probably not preempted by federal patent law. 
B. . . . NOR SHOULD THEY BE 
Briefly, there are several reasons state antitrust challenges 
to pay-for-delay settlements should not be preempted by federal 
patent law. First, state antitrust laws are the only vehicle for 
indirect purchaser damage awards.241 State antitrust claims 
that approximate a given federal antitrust claim are brought in 
federal cases to provide an avenue for relief for indirect 
purchasers.242 California v. ARC America Corp. suggests that 
state indirect-purchaser remedies could provide relief only 
upon success of state antitrust claims, but that they may not 
                                                          
apply to pay-for-delay settlements because “the anticompetitive consequences 
of the exclusion payment flow from the agreement between the private parties, 
not from the result of the petition to the court or from any action by that 
court.” 1 HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 6, at 15-31. 
 239. See LESLIE, supra note 5, at 112. 
 240. The analysis in Part II.A, supra, suggests that it probably would not. 
 241. See supra notes 70–72 and accompanying text. 
 242. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
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provide relief under federal antitrust law.243 If state antitrust 
claims are preempted by federal patent law in a given case, 
monetary damages for indirect purchasers are foreclosed. 
Perhaps this issue has been overlooked because courts may 
treat state antitrust claims as counterparts of equivalent scope 
to federal antitrust claims. However, state and federal 
antitrust laws are not coextensive,244 and state antitrust laws 
may be given a more robust interpretation than a federal 
counterpart in state court.245 It follows that state court 
challenges may be an attractive option for pay-for-delay 
plaintiffs if state laws are potentially more likely to result in 
antitrust liability. The presumption against preemption further 
supports allowing plaintiffs to use the historic police powers in 
areas like antitrust to challenge anticompetitive conduct in 
state courts.246 
Finally, at least under the framework announced in Hunter 
Douglas, whether state claims can survive federal preemption 
depends on whether the challenged conduct is “protected or 
governed” by federal patent law, which virtually mirrors the 
“scope of the patent” test for legality of pay-for-delay 
settlements.247 Apart from the circularity of a standard that 
would preempt a state claim based on the same legal question 
the claim is meant to challenge, courts and scholars have 
                                                          
 243. California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 100 (1989). The Court 
opined: 
Under federal law, no indirect purchaser is entitled to sue for 
damages for a Sherman Act violation, and there is no claim here that 
state law could provide a remedy for the federal violation that federal 
law forbids. Had these cases gone to trial and a Sherman Act 
violation been proved, only direct purchasers would have been 
entitled to damages for that violation, and there is no suggestion by 
the parties that the same rule should not apply to distributing that 
part of the fund that was meant to settle the Sherman Act claims. 
The issue before us is whether this rule limiting recoveries under the 
Sherman Act also prevents indirect purchasers from recovering 
damages flowing from violations of state law, despite express state 
statutory provisions giving such purchasers a damages cause of 
action. 
Id. 
 244. See supra note 192 and accompanying text. 
 245. See, e.g., O’Brien v. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc., 294 Kan. 
318, 341, 349 (2012) (declining to follow the Supreme Court’s application of 
rule of reason analysis to a Sherman Act section 1 challenge to vertical price-
fixing based on a conflicting interpretation of applicable state antitrust law). 
 246. See supra notes 199–201 and accompanying text. 
 247. See supra note 236 and accompanying text. 
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renounced the “scope of the patent” test.248 For example, Abbott 
and Michel argue that the “right to purchase exclusion that 
could not have been obtained through the strength of the 
patent at the time of the settlement agreement” is not one of  
 
the rights protected by the patent system.249 Critically, the 
authors argue that 
the scope of the patent grant does not include the right to pay 
potential competitors to stay off the market because the source of the 
exclusion is the payment, not the exclusionary power of the patent. 
Because the payment falls outside the scope of the patent grant, 
antitrust law may judge its legality.250 
These rationales further compel a conclusion that federal 
patent law should not preempt state antitrust law in pay-for-
delay settlements. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Pay-for-delay settlements have posed a legal conundrum 
since the passage of the Hatch-Waxman Act. There currently 
exists a stark division among the federal circuit courts as to the 
legality of these settlements, and the legal field is awaiting a 
ruling from the Supreme Court to provide guidance. Of the 
various legal theories applied by the courts thus far, all are 
influenced by the tension between patent law and antitrust 
law. This tension is illustrated by the prospect of preemption of 
state antitrust law by federal patent law. Presently, only one 
pay-for-delay settlement has been challenged in state court, 
and the Supreme Court of California is likely to address the 
issue of preemption when it eventually decides that case. Based 
on the guidance that the Supreme Court has provided on the 
preemptive effects of federal patent law and on the doctrine of 
preemption in general, state antitrust claims should not be 
preempted by federal patent law. Concluding that they are 
preempted would not be compatible with Supreme Court 
precedent, nor would it be good policy. 
 
                                                          
 248. See, e.g., In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 214 (3d Cir. 2012) 
(“In our view, that test improperly restricts the application of antitrust law 
and is contrary to the policies underlying the Hatch–Waxman Act and a long 
line of Supreme Court precedent on patent litigation and competition.”). 
 249. Abbott & Michel, supra note 5, at 405. 
 250. Id. at 408. 
